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PARTIES
Plaintiff-Appellant is George B. Handy. Handy is an attorney. (Id.) Handy is
still practicing law at the age of 84. In October 2003, Handy discovered a passbook in
the "junk drawer95 of a credenza at his office. This passbook was for a savings account
drawn on the United States National Bank of Oregon. Prior to October of 2003, Handy
had never seen this passbook. Prior to October of 2003, Handy was not aware of this
passbook's existence. The passbook reported that between July 29, 1971, and September
14, 1971, the sum of $150,000 had been deposited into that account with no withdrawals
noted in the book.1 Handy does not know who made those deposits or who opened that
account. He does know, however, that he never signed the signature card that would
have allowed him to withdraw money from that account and that the person or persons
identified on the signature card owned the account. Handy suspects that the money was
deposited by a former client, Richard Anderson, now deceased

1

But as the undisputed evidence developed at trial showed, it was not necessary to
have a passbook to withdraw the money. The undisputed evidence at trial also showed
that the name on the signature card could differ from that of the person named on the
passbook and that, if this occurred, the person who signed the signature card and not the
person named in the passbook owned the account. More importantly, the evidence at trial
showed that in 1980 the United States National Bank of Oregon did away with passbook
savings accounts converting all such accounts to statement accounts which rendered
passbooks worthless. Passbooks were rendered worthless because following that
conversion, bank customers could deposit or withdraw from their accounts by showing
identification and submitting the appropriate deposit or withdrawal form.
1

That account was opened in the name of "George B. Handy, Trustee." Handy,
however, had never entered into any trust agreement with respect to this account or the
monies allegedly deposited therein. Handy never contacted the Anderson family to see if
they were beneficiaries of this so-called trust. Nevertheless, despite not being the owner
of this account, Handy sued Defendant/Appellee U.S. Bank National Association for the
$150,000 plus interest allegedly accruing in that account which he contends would be
between $500,000 and $800,000. U.S. Bank National Association ("U.S. Bank") is the
successor-in-interest to United States National Bank of Oregon.
II.
CITATION TO THE RECORD
The transcript of the trial in this matter appears in the record on page 275.
References to the trial testimony of witnesses will be by "Transcript" followed by a page
number on which the testimony appears. The other portions of the record will be
referred to as "R." followed by the appropriate page number on which the motion,
pleading or other matter appears. For the Court's convenience, copies of the District
Court's Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are
included in the Addendum to this Brief

2

DDL
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Handy appeals from a judgement entered by the Honorable Brent W. West in
favor of U.S. Bank following a bench trial on February 6, 2006. (R. 265.) This Court
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).
IV.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
In his Opening Brief, Handy presents the following issues for review on appeal:
(1) "Did the District Court error in ruling that Oregon law would apply a 'presumption of
payment' to the savings account at issue;" and (2) "[D]id the District Court error in
ruling that, if the presumption of payment rule does apply, the plaintiffs evidence did
not rebut the presumption?" {Opening Brief, p. 1.) U.S. Bank submits that Handy'sstatement of issues is much too narrow. U.S. Bank submits that the following is a more
accurate statement of the additional issues raised by this appeal: (1) Whether there are
other grounds in the record sufficient to support the District Court's decision as a matter
of law, such as Handy having failed to marshal the evidence and/or having waived the
right to challenge the District Court's Findings that are dispositive of his claim; (2)
whether, because Handy is neither the owner of the account nor a trustee, he lacks
standing; and (3) whether, irrespective of any presumption of payment, Handy met his
burden of proof?

3

It is also U.S. Bank's belief that Handy does not set forth the correct standard of
review with respect to the issues he does identify. Not only does Handy not marshal the
evidence in this case, he insists that this Court's review of the District Court's findings is
"denovo." {Opening BriefI pp. 1-2.) U.S. Bank submits that the following is a more
accurate statement of the standard of review to be employed by this Court in addressing
the issues raised by this appeal: When reviewing a bench trial, Appellate Courts may not
set aside a District Court's finding of fact '^unless clearly erroneous." Moreover, in
assessing whether a finding is clearly erroneous, reviewing Courts must give "due regard
. . . to the opportunity of the Trial Court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Utah
R.Civ. P. 52(a). Roderickv. Ricks, 2002 UT 84, f 27; 54 P. 3d 1119 at 1124-25. A
finding attacked as lacking adequate evidentiary support is deemed "clearly erroneous"
only if that finding is against the clear weight of the evidence. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha
Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899-901 (Utah 1989). The evidence is also viewed in the light
most favorable to the District Court's findings and the District Court is to be affirmed if
there is a reasonable basis for doing so. Gilmore v. Gilmore, 745 P.2d 461, 462 (Utah
App. 1987). Moreover, as a prerequisite to attacking the District Court's finding of fact,
the appellant is required to marshal all the evidence in support of the finding in order to
demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is
insufficient to support the finding. Grayson Roper, Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470
(Utah 1989). Finally, this Court is free to affirm the District Court on any grounds for

4

which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied
upon by the District Court. See Diploma v. Iplomab McPhie, 2001 Ut. 61, ^ 18, 29 P.3d
1225 ("An appellate court may affirm the judgment appeal if it is sustainable on any
legal ground or theory apparent on the record").
V.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
There are no dispositive Constitutional provisions, statutes or rules.

VL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE RE: NATURE OF THE CASE
In October of 2003, Handy found a passbook in the junk drawer of his credenza.
The passbook was issued by the United States National Bank of Oregon. The passbook
showed five deposits totaling $150,000 made between July 24 and September 14, 1971.
Handy did not make any deposits into that account and none of the money in the account
was his money. Handy did not open that account. Handy did not sign a signature card
even though a signature card is required to withdraw money from the account. Handy
did not know who was authorized to take money out of the account.
In the Fall of 1980, the United States National Bank of Oregon did away with all
passbook savings accounts. At that time, all active (i.e., not closed) passbook accounts
were converted into a statement savings account. After the conversion to statement
savings accounts, passbooks were worthless. The unused passbooks were handed out to

5

students at school classes. Bank tellers likewise instructed customers that passbooks
could be thrown away because they had no value.
The passbook which Handy found in his credenza had "George B. Handy
Trustee" written on it, but Handy did not know who wrote the name on the passbook.
Handy did not know when the name was written on the passbook. Handy was unaware
of any trust having been created with regard to this passbook account. There was no
ascertainable beneficiary identified for the alleged trust associated with the passbook
account. Handy, however, suspected that a long-deceased client, Richard Anderson, had
opened the account. Handy has not contacted any member of the Anderson family to
determine whether this account was opened by Richard Anderson, including determining
whether the Anderson family had closed the account following Richard Anderson's
death in 1972,
VTL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE RE: COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Handy brought a lawsuit to recover money from a savings account of a
predecessor of U.S. Bank. In his Complaint, Handy alleges that he was the "owner" of
the passbook and account. U.S. Bank moved for summary judgment. (R. 75.) The
District Court denied that Motion. (R. 149.) Thereafter, this case was tried to the
District Court on February 6, 2006. When Handy rested, U.S. Bank moved to dismiss

6

based upon Handy's failure to meet his burden of proof. {Transcript, p. 85-89.) The
District Court took that Motion under advisement. (Id. at 89-90.)
On March 7, 2006, the District Court entered its Memorandum Decision finding
in favor of U.S. Bank. In that Memorandum Decision, the District Court found that
Handy had the burden to prove his claim, including the existence of a debt represented
by the passbook, by a preponderance of the evidence but that Handy had not met this
burden, including overcoming the common law presumption of payment from lapse of
time. (R. 251-253.) The District Court likewise found that the so-called trust was a
"dry" or passive trust imposing no duties upon Handy as 'trustee." (R. 253.)2 On May 1,
2006, the District Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law consistent

2

In the Memorandum Decision, the District Court also explained why it had ruled
in favor of U.S. Bank following a trial but had earlier denied U.S. Bank's Motion for
Summary Judgment. The District Court stated that:
Defendant moved for summary judgment arguing that Plaintiffs claim was
barred by the presumption of payment. The Court denied Defendants5
Motion noting that the passbook was some evidence of non payment. As a
motion for summary judgment, the Court viewed that evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. In denying Defendants' Motion,
the Court did not grant summary judgment on that issue to the Plaintiff,
who had not filed a summary judgment motion of his own. Having now
heard the evidence regarding the passbook, the Bank's practices, and the
extent of Plaintiff s knowledge, the Court assigned the passbook what the
Court considers to be its appropriate [evidentiary] weight.
(R. 251 fii. 2)(Emphasis added).
7

with its Memorandum Decision. (R. 258.,)3
On May 26, 2006, Handy filed his Notice of Appeal In that Notice of Appeal,
Handy challenges the District Court's rulings in their entirety. (R. 265.) In his opening
Memorandum, however, Handy only challenges the District Court's application of the
presumption of payment and the District Court's findings that Handy had not rebutted
this presumption. Handy does not, in other words, attacked the District Court's finding
that Handy had failed to meet his burden of proof, that Handy never signed a signature
card which meant he did not own the account, and that there was no trust for which
Handy was a trustee.
VIIL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE RE: STATEMENT OF FACTS
In its Memorandum Decision, the Court correctly noted that Handy had the
burden to prove his claim, including the existence of a debt, by a preponderance of
evidence. (R. 25L) Included within this burden, Handy also had to prove that he owned
the account. With this burden in mind, the District Court found that Handy did not know
who opened the account, who had made the deposits or even how the passbook came
into his possession. The District Court also noted that a signature card was required to
open a passbook savings account and that a customer could put a different name on the

3

The District Court's Memorandum Decision supplemented its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law. See Ellerman v. Center Point Prepress, Inc., 22 P.3d 795, 800
fc. 3 (Wash. 2001).
8

signature card than on the passbook. Of apparent significance to the District Court, was
the fact that a person whose name appeared on the signature card could withdraw money
from the account without a passbook and that although Handy did not know whose name
appeared on the signature card, he testified that his name was not on the signature card.
(R. 252-253.) The District Court noted, too, that in the Fall of 1980 the United States
National Bank of Oregon did away with its passbooks. Thereafter, all passbook accounts
converted to statement savings accounts. With this conversion, passbooks became
worthless since the owner of the account could withdraw money without a passbook.
The District Court likewise "severely discounted" Handy's claim that the debt was still
owed because he had not authorized any person to withdraw money from the account.
Not surprisingly, the District Court found that Handy had not met his burden of proof.
(R. 252-253.) In addition, the District Court also concluded that there was no trust since
there was no trust document other than the passbook itself, Handy did not know who the
settlor was nor were there any ascertainable beneficiaries. (R. 253.) As previously
noted, thereafter the District Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R.
258) mirroring its Memorandum Decision. The evidence supporting the District Court's
ruling in these matters is separately addressed herein below.
Signature Cards
Denise Martens is currently a Vice President of U.S. Bank. She is U.S. Bank's
Regional Operations Manager for Oregon and Washington. Previously she had been

9

employed by United States Bank of Oregon. Martfetfs testified that the person who signs
the signature card on a passbook savings account has the authority to make deposits and
withdrawals in that account. According to Marten, deposits and withdrawals could also
be made without presenting a passbook to the bank. When, for example, a customer
wanted to deposit or withdraw funds from his or her savings account and did not have
their passbook, the customer would make that deposit or withdrawal with the assistance
of the teller who would identify the customer, complete a withdrawal ticket, confirm the
identification on the signature card, obtain the approval of a bank officer and then
complete the transaction. Assuming that the account was not closed, the next time the
customer came to the bank with his or her savings account passbook, the savings book
would be updated to reflect the prior transactions. More importantly, Martens noted that
in this particular case the August 11, 1971 deposit had been made without a passbook
being presented to the bank. Martens' testimony on these matters was as follows:
Q:

You're familiar with opening accounts?

A:

Yes.

Q:

It is true, isn't it, that every account requires a signature card
to open the account?

A:

That's correct.

Q:

And the person that signs that signature card has
authority to make deposits and withdrawals in that
account?

A:

Yes.
10

Do you have in front of you [the passbook] Exhibit 1?
Yes.
Let me have you look at that and go to the page that shows
the deposits. Let me know when you get there. Do you have
that?
Yes.
Would you look at the third line down; do you see that?
Yes.
Do you see the initials there?
NOB?
Yes.
Right.
Do you know what NOB stands for?
No book*
What does it mean, no book?
It means that when a customer came in to make a deposit
or withdrawal and they didn't have their passbook the
teller would then get the proper approval to accept the
transaction without the book and then the next time our
customer came in with their passbook the teller that
assisted that customer would look up on the line to be
sure, the computer, in this case it was a before the
computer, to in the microfiche and update the passbook

11

to indicate what our bank records showed.4
Q:

Why would NOB be written there instead of initials of the
individual who was helping the person?

A:

We didn't - we weren't able to falsify or forge another
employee's initials so the NOB meant no book available
during that transaction.

Q:

Okay. And you said just a second ago in your testimony:
With the proper approvals we would be able to go ahead and
authorize a transaction. Is that true for withdrawals as
well?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Tell me what the proper approvals were? What was the
process if somebody came in without a passbook savings
account and wanted to withdraw money?

A:

The teller would identify the customer, the customer would,
of course, complete a withdrawal or deposit ticket, and then
they would need to be sure that it was the customer, that it
was the account owner, either by identification or the
signature card, and then they would need to get a bank
officer's approval.

Q:

Okay. Was that something that you were able to do
many times as a teller?

A:

Yes.5

4

This testimony indicates that bank records, not passbooks, controlled the status
of the account.
5

{Transcript, pp. 128-130)(Emphasis added). Martens' answer to the last
question is highly illustrative of Handy's failure to marshal the evidence. Handy does not
mention Martens' testimony in his Opening Brief. Instead, Handy states that: Although it
was possible to make a withdrawal without a passbook under some circumstances, "it was
not common." {Opening Brief pp. 7-8.)
12

Passbooks are Worthless
Martens also testified that in 1980, United States Bank of Oregon went to
statement savings account instead of passbook savings account. When this changeover
occurred, passbooks became worthless. Martens testified that it was common on savings
accounts to have multiple names on the account. When this occurred, the customer
would decide whose name went on the passbook, but that the legal ownership of the
account would be according to the signature card. In other words, the name appearing
on the signature card owned the account. Martens' testimony on these facts was as
follows:
Q:

In 1980, the end of 1980 when the bank went to statement
savings instead of passbook savings, what was the value of a
passbook?

A:

Virtually nothing. It was just a record for the customer.

Q:

Okay. Did you take their passbooks away when they would
come in?

A:

No.

Q:

You would allow them to keep it but it had no value?

A:

Correct.

Q:

Are you are of accounts that would have multiple names on
the accounts?

A:

Uh-huh.

Q:

Is that a yes?

ia

A:

Sorry.

Q:

Thank you. Was that an uncommon occurrence at the
bank?

A:

To have an account with multiple names?

Q:

Right.

A:

No, it was common.

Q;

And would signature cards be required on those accounts?

A:

Yes.

Q:

How were accounts dealt with that had multiple names when
you would put the name on a passbook?

A:

Typically we would put the name on the passbook as the
customer requested so if we had multiple names we
would ask the customer how they would want their
passbook to read, but the legal ownership of the account
would be according to the signature card.6
Records Are Not Kept On Closed Accounts

U.S. Bank has no records showing who opened this account or what happened to
the monies initially deposited according to the passbook. But this was also explained by
Martens. U.S. Bank had a seven year retention policy on closed accounts. That is when the owner closed his or her account by withdrawing all the money, the records on

6

{Transcript, pp. 13 l-132)(Emphasis added). Martens9 testimony that it was the
person shown on the signature card who owned the account is another example of
Handy's failure to marshal the evidence since this evidence, too, was omitted from
Handy5 s Opening Brief.
14

that account would be retained for seven years and then destroyed. The fact that the
records on this account were destroyed was powerful evidence that the account had been
closed as a result of the owner's, whoever that was, withdrawal of those funds. Martens'
testimony on these facts was as follows:
Q:

Do you have a clear understanding as to what the retention
policy is at U.S. Bank for customer accounts?

A:

Seven years after closure.

Q:

Okay. Seven years? And that starts after the closing of the
account?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Are there also documents that have only a two-year retention
period?

A:

Yes.

Q:

And what would those be?

A:

Teller cash errors, balancing sheets, sheets, any type of teller
transaction tapes, typical forms like that, accounting forms.

Q:

Okay. But on any account that is closed. What's the time?

A:

Seven years. 7

7

Handy testified that he never received any notice from the Bank concerning this
account. Handy testified that he never received an IRS 1099 form relative to this account.
Handy testified that he never received a statement of interest earned on this account.
{Transcript, pp. 27-28.) The obvious inference to be drawn from the lack of any
communication from United States Bank of Oregon to Handy concerning this account is
Handy was not the owner and/or the account had been closed.
15

Q:

Do you know if the bank retention policy requires that
documents be destroyed after that time?

A:

It would depend on the document. But most always we
would just do a retention period on that and then the
company that we hire to keep our records would then destroy
the records.8
The Mystery

Handy called at trial Douglas L. DeFries to testify with respect to interest.
DeFries is Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer for Bank of Utah.
DeFries testified that assuming money was still in the account, and depending on how
interest was calculated, the present value of that account would be a low of $535,914.59
and a high of $832,134.3 8.9 Handy also called David Martin, by way of deposition, who
testified that there was no evidence that this account had ever escheated to the State of

8

(Transcript, pp. 132-133)(Emphasis added). Martens'testimony was largely
corroborated by the testimony of another U.S. Bank employee, Kate Thomasen, who also
had worked for United States Bank of Oregon. Thomasen testified, for example, that in
the fall of 1980 the bank decided to change from passbook savings accounts to statement
savings accounts (Transcript p. 91); that after the conversion, customers were told to
throw their passbooks away (Id., p. 92); that owners of the passbook savings accounts
were notified in writing of the change to statement savings accounts (Id. at p. 93); that
prior to the conversion it was not necessary to present the passbook to withdraw money
from a passbook savings account (Id. at p. 94); that all passbook savings accounts were
converted to statement accounts (Id. at pp. 96-97); that she found no records of this
account on U.S. Bank's computer system (Id. at p. 114); and, most importantly, when
asked by Handy's attorney what the absence of records indicated to her, Thomasen
testified: "Based on the fact that the account is not open and it is not at the state, I
feel that the funds were withdrawn at some point in time." (Id., at pp. 116-117.)
9

(Transcript, pp. 55-57.)
16

Oregon, and to confirm that U.S. Bank no longer had any records on this account.10
Handy himself was his only fact witness and he had no evidence to offer with respect to
the existence of a debt or any other fact related to this account. In his own words, Handy
said that everything about this account, including how he came into possession of the
passbook, was a "mystery."11 Handy's testimony was as follows:
Q:

And Fm going to hand you this and ask you: Do you
recognize this?

A:

Yes, I do.

Q:

Can you identify it for me, please.

A:

Well, it's a saving account passbook with the United States
National Bank of Oregon and it's - the account number is
403111-8.

Q:

And are you the person named on this passbook?

A:

Yes. My name is George B. Handy and the passbook is
issued in the name of George B. Handy, Trustee.

Q:

I see that's a handwriting on that; is that correct?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Did you write that?

10

{Transcript, p. 83.)

11

Handy's lack of personal knowledge about this account was a material fact to
the District Court. The District Court noted that in the cases allowing a plaintiff to
recover deposits based upon the existence of a passbook, the plaintiff was a depositor
and/or had personal knowledge regarding the opening of and transactions in the account;
whereas when the person in possession of the passbook lacked such knowledge, he or she
typically found to not have met their burden of proof. (R. 251-52).
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A:

No, I did not.

Q:

Mr. Handy, when did you first learn of this passbook?

A:

In October of 2003.

Q:

And how did you come into possession of this passbook?

A:

Well, I was - 1 have a credenza in my office, it's not my
working desk, and in the middle drawer of the credenza I've
always - 1 just for years have just put different papers, and
letters, and cards, and clippings that I thought I might look at
some future time and I never did. And I was cleaning out
this credenza one day and putting hands full of papers in the
wastebasket and something fell on the floor and I look at it, it
was this passbook, Plaintiffs Exhibit No. I.12

Q:

And is this the first time you became aware of this passbook?

A:

Yes, it's the first time that I ever saw this passbook.

Q:

Prior to October 2003 had you ever seen this passbook
before?

A:

No, I never had.

Q:

Did you have any knowledge of this passbook prior to
October of--

A:

No, I never—

Q:

2003?

A:

No, I never had any knowledge of it prior to October 2003.

12

Handy described the drawer in which the passbook savings account book was
discovered as a "junk drawer." {Transcript, p. 38.)
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Q:

And we're talking about this account, so we're clear, as
noted as 403111-8; is that correct?

A:

That's correct

Q:

Clearly you have thought about this. Do you have any idea
how this passbook made it into your credenza?

A:

Well, I have given considerable thought and I've racked my
brain several times over it and it is a complete mystery to
me.13
Handy Never Withdrew The Money

The only evidence, such as it was, that the debt represented by the passbook was
still owing came from Handy. That evidence, which the District Court "severely
discounted" (R. 253) was as follows:
Q:

I'm going to refer you to Rule 6, its in the back of the
passbook.

A:

So that entitled withdrawals. And Rule 6 in the passbook.
* * *

Q:

Can I get you to read the Rule section?

A:

Yes.

Q:

And can I ask you to read the first paragraph of Rule 6?

A:

Entitled withdrawals?

13

{Transcript, pp. ll-13)(Emphasis added).
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A:

Rule 6 'The passbook must be presented to the Bank when a
withdrawal is made.'

Q:

Did you ever make a withdrawal on this account?

A:

No, I did not.

Q:

Did you ever authorize a power of attorney to anyone to
make a withdrawal on this account?

A:

No, I did not.

Q:

Did you ever notify the bank that there was a lost passbook?

A:

No, I did not.

Q:

Did you ever sign an affidavit of a lost passbook?

A:

No, I did not.

Q:

Did you ever receive any form of payment on this account?

A:

No, I never did.14
The Mystery Continues

As previously shown, the District Court noted that Handy5 s lack of "personal

14

{Transcript, pp. 26-27.) The Court discounted this evidence because, as
previously shown, there were numerous other ways in which the funds could be
withdrawn from the account without presenting a passbook and, most importantly, as the
District Court found: "The Plaintiffs testimony that he did not authorize any other person
to withdraw from the account is severely discounted by the fact that Plaintiff does not
know who created the account or who else the account owner might have authorized on
the signature card. (R. 253.)
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knowledge" about this account was particularly telling. Handy's testimony was as
follows:
Q:

You have thought about who potentially placed, or might
have put this money in this account; is that correct?

A:

Yes, I have.

Q:

And in your opinion do you have an opinion as to who may
have placed the money in this account?

A:

Yes, I do.

Q:

Who is that?

A:

Well, I worked with this man named Richard Anderson and
at one time he asked me if I would mind if he would put
money in my - 1 think it's been 35 years ago, I think he
might have said, "My trust account," or he could have said,
"a trust account." And I said, "Yes, that's all right." And
he's the only person that ever talked to me about putting
money in a trust account, his money in my trust account or a
trust account in my name.

Q:

Did he ever mention it to you again?

A:

No, he never did.15
There Was No Trust

The District Court found that Handy was not a trustee. The District Court also
concluded that there was no trust; that there were no ascertainable beneficiaries; and that
the passbook did not impose any affirmative duties on Handy.16 Under these
15

(Transcript, pp. 29-30.)

16

Although the District Court may designate a statement as a Finding or
Conclusion, it is the Appellate Court that determines whether a Finding is in fact a
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circumstances, Handy held the property (i.e. passbook) for the beneficiaries. Handy did
not, in other words, have any claim to the monies in the account. (R. 253.) The evidence
that no trust existed came from Handy who testified as follows:
Q:

Did Mr. Anderson, when he asked you about placing money
in the trust account in your name, did he ever suggest why he
wanted to put that money in there?

A:

No, he did not.

Q:

Where is Mr. Anderson now?

A:

Mr. Anderson died in a plane crash on January the 2nd of
1972.

Q:

And by my - let's refer back to the passbook. What was the
date of the last transaction in that passbook?

A:

September the 14th, 1971.

Q:

Is my math right; that Mr. Anderson was killed
approximately three and a half months after that,
September 14th?

A:

That seems appropriate.17

Q:

Mr. Handy, why did you bring this action?

A:

Well, because I was named as trustee. Someone had

Finding or a Conclusion of Law. 550 West Broadway Assoc v. Redevelopment Agency of
Salt Lake City, 784P.2d 1162, 1171 (Utah 1989).
17

Anderson's death in 1972 is another fact on which Handy did not marshal the
evidence. Specifically, Handy makes no attempt to explain how Anderson could have
placed the money into the account and the savings passbook into the drawer of the
credenza when Handy did not acquire that credenza until after 1975 by which time
Anderson had been deceased three years or more. (Transcript, p. 37.)
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confidence in me and gave me a responsibility as a trustee
and I think it is my obligation to get these funds from the
bank. The bank refuses to pay them over and I just think it's
my responsibility to get the money. It isn't the bank's money,
it isn't - 1 don't think it's my money, but it is somebody's
money and I'm a trustee of that account18

Q:

Okay. Do you have any idea why a passbook that you said
showed that somebody with great confidence in you would
get thrown into a junk drawer in your office?

A:

No, I do not.

Q:

Did that concern you?

A:

Well, I just don't know when it was put in that junk
drawer, I just don't know. That interests me because if
somebody had given me that passbook I would have put
it in a secure place and to be checked upon once in a
while, and find out what they wanted to do with, or
something like that. But that wasn't the case. It was in this
and I didn't know it was there and I - until I was cleaning
out that drawer in October of 2003.19
* * *

Q:

Have you done anything to contact the Anderson family to
determine if they have any records regarding that account?

A:

Well, I know that his first wife died, his second wife died, a
son died, and I know nothing more about the Anderson
family than that.

18

(Transcript, pp. 32-33)(Emphasis added).

19

(Transcript, p. 39)(Emphasis added). Yet another example of failing to marshal
the evidence. The fact that the passbook was discovered in a "junk drawer" is a strong
inference that it was of no value. That is - the account had been long closed.
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Q:

Have you done anything to find out anything else about the
family?

A:

Not at this point. I intend to do that, though. That might be
my obligation to see if they know anything about it. I don't
know what the purpose was in putting the money in the bank.

Q:

Why haven't you checked that?

A:

Well, it may be a little premature.

Q:

Why is that?

A:

Well, your bank still has the money. I don't have the money.

Q:

No, but if you're a trustee and you said it was because
someone put a great deal of confidence in you, if there was
away to find out anything about that money, you would want
to find it out, wouldn't you?

A:

Yes. I would do my utmost to find out about it.20
* * *

Q:

You are not aware of any trust document that names you as
trustee that is unaccounted for or that is in the amount of
approximately $150,000 from the 1970s, are you?

A:

No, I am not 21
* * *

Q:

As you sit here today you have no evidence from any source
about a trust document that you would have been named as a
trustee in approximately 1971 that contained SI50,000?

20

{Transcript, pp. 44-45.)

21

{Transcript, pp. 45-46)(Emphasis added).
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A:

The answer is that the only document I have is the
savings account22
Handy Has No Evidence

In its Memorandum Decision, the Court found that Handy had not met his burden
to show by satisfactory evidence that the debt was not paid. (R. 254.) In the
Conclusions of Law entered, thereafter, the Court stated that because Handy had failed to
meet his burden of proof, his claims failed. (R. 262.) The lack of evidence to support
his claims came from the following testimony given by Handy:
Q:

The savings account passbook that you found in October
of 2003 is not your trust account, is it?

A:

That is not my trust account.

Q:

Okay.

A:

Well, it is my trust account with my name on it but it's
not a trust account I had myself in the bank in Ogden.

Q:

Okay. You had no idea who wrote your name on that
passbook, do you?

A:

No, I don't know that at all.

Q:

You have no idea when your name was written on that
passbook, do you?

A:

No, I could assume. I could guess with you but I wasn't
there when it was done.

(Transcript, p. 46)(Emphasis added).
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In fact, prior to October of 2003, you had never been to the
Bank in Oregon to open any account, had you?
No, I never had.
You had not filled out any work or any paperwork to
become a trustee for any bank?
I didn't up in Oregon. I didn't open this trust account
and I've had nothing to do with it whatsoever.
You didn't ever deal with anyone at the bank prior to
October of 2003 regarding this account in any manner,
did you?
That's correct.
You did not sign any documents to open the account or to
put your name on as an owner of the account, did you?
Not to my recollection, I did not.
You did not deposit any of the money into this account?
No, I did not.
And as you sit here today you do not know who put the
money into the account?
No. No, I couldn't say definitely who put that money in
the account.
You have no idea as you sit here today who has ever been
authorized to take money out of that account, do you?
Well, I would assume with my name on it I could have gone
and taken that money out of the account because the account
is in my name as trustee.
The passbook has your name on it?
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Yes, the passbook has my name on it.
You have no idea whose name is on the account that was
opened up with the bank, do you?
All I know is what the trust - what the bank book says.
AH right. You have no idea what address the bank
identified as the account?
No, I don't
You didn't ever sign a signature card for that account?
No, I didn't
You don't know who did, do you?
No, I don't
You don't know if there were several people who did?
I don't know whether any was signed at all.
And as you sit here today you have no idea whether money
was ever taken out of that account, do you?
Only what the passbook says, it can't be withdrawn without
presenting the passbook and it shows that there were no
withdrawals.
And I appreciate that I'm not asking you to read the
passbook. I am asking you as you sit here today whether
you have any information about whether or not money
has been taken out of that account?
Not any more than you do, I suppose.
Okay. And you have no idea who could have taken money
out of that account?
27

A:

Or whether it was taken out of the account, no, I don't, only
what the passbook says.

Q:

You have talked about when you found the passbook and you
said it was the first time you had ever seen it in your life?

A:

Yes. And I am certain of that

Q:

So that means you did not put that passbook in your
drawer?

A:

It is a mystery to me. It really is a mystery.

Q:

You have no idea who provided that passbook to you, do
you?

A:

No, I don't.

Q:

You have no idea when that passbook was provided to
you if there was in fact money in that account, do you?

A:

No, I don't.

Q:

You do know that's not your money that was ever put in
this account?

A:

I didn't put any money in the account23
DL
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Irrespective of whether the District Court correctly applied the common law
presumption of payment rule, it found that Handy had failed to prove his claim by

23

{Transcript, pp. 41-44)(Emphasis added). Handy is bound by his testimony. See
Evans v. Butters, 399 P.2d 210, 212 (Utah 1965).
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preponderance of the evidence. Irrespective of whether Handy presented sufficient
evidence to rebut the presumption of payment rule, the District Court found that he did
not sign the signature card for the passbook savings account and was not a trustee which,
as a matter of law, means that Handy was not entitled to the monies in the account, if
there were such monies and, most importantly, he lacked standing to pursue this claim.
With respect to the District Court's application of the common law presumption of
payment rule, there was nothing incorrect about that decision. Oregon recognizes the
common law rule and, despite Handy's arguments to the contrary, and while Oregon has
yet to do so, other courts have routinely applied this rule to passbook savings accounts.
Likewise, despite Handy's failure to marshal the evidence, the District Court's finding
that Handy did not rebut this presumption was not clearly erroneous.
X.
HANDY HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
AND WAIVED ANY CHALLENGE TO THE DISTRICT COURT'S
FINDINGS BY NOT ADDRESSING THOSE ISSUES ON APPEAL
Although Handy insists that "[bjecause the Bank offered no contrary evidence as
to the disposition of the bank account at issue, this Court's review is not a comparison of
weighing of the evidence, or review of findings of fact based upon such a comparison."24
That is not true. Not only has U.S. Bank presented evidence to the effect that the
account was closed, that Handy has no standing to bring this case since he is clearly not

24

{Opening Memorandum^.

1.)
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the owner of the account and/or a trustee, but the Court found in favor of U.S. Bank on
those and other issues, including finding that Handy had failed to meet his burden of
proof. Handy also apparently challenges those Findings but does so without having
marshaled the evidence, which is fatal to his appeal.
Utah Appellate Courts do not take a District Court's factual findings lightly.
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Coal Storage & Warehouse, Inc.,, 872 P.2d 1051, 1052 (Utah
App. 1954). Handy bears a heavy burden in challenging a District Court's factual
findings. To successfully appeal a District Court's findings of fact, the appellant's
counsel must play the devil's advocate. "[Attorneys] must extricate [themselves] from
their client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position in order to properly
discharge the [marshaling] duty . . . the challenger must present, in comprehensive and
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports
the refindings the appellant's resist." West Valley City v. MajesticInv. Co.., 818 P.2d
1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). Once the appellant has established a pillar supporting his
or her adversary's position, they then must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence and
show why those pillars fail to support the District Court's findings. Oneida, 872 P.2d at
1053. Simply put, the appellant must show that the District Court's findings are so
lacking as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly
erroneous. Id.
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This rigorous standard reflects the doctrine that Appellate Courts do not sit to
retry cases submitted on disputed facts. Accordingly, when the duty to marshal is not
properly discharged, the Appellate Court refuses to consider the merits of the challenge
to the findings and accepts the findings as valid. (Id.) This means that the Findings and
Conclusions with the District Court made in this Memorandum Decision and Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, including Handy's contention that the District Court erred
in finding that he had not rebutted the presumption of payment, cannot be a challenge in
this appeal.25 It is also important to note that not only does Handy's failure to marshal
the evidence preclude challenge but, by not addressing them, Handy has waived the right
to challenge the District Court's rulings on matters that are dispositive of his claims.
Admittedly, in his Notice of Appeal, Handy appeals from the District Court's
rulings in their entirety, including the findings that he was not a trustee. (R. 265.) But in
his Opening Brief Handy only challenges the District Court's application of the
presumption of payment rule and the District Court's finding that Handy had not rebutted
this presumption. (Opening Brief p. 1.) By not addressing other issues, Handy has
conceded those matters for purposes of affirming the District Court's decision. See
Paxton v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah App. 1991) More
importantly, Handy's concession with respect to these issues is dispositive. Consider, for

25

Handy's selective citations to the record does not begin to marshal the evidence;
it is nothing more than an attempt to reargue the case - a practice that this Court has
rejected consistently in other cases. See Oneida, 872 P.2d at 1053.
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example, the District Court's finding that Handy had not met his burden of proof, not
only with respect to rebutting the presumption of payment, but on his claims in general.
With that Finding alone, Handy loses. Similarly, although Handy claims to own the
account and monies therein, by finding that Handy had not signed a signature card and
that he was not a trustee, as a matter of law, Handy had no entitlement to or control over
any monies in the account. He owned and/or controlled, in other words, nothing. This is
true even though he may be shown as a 'trustee" on the passbook. See Bogart, The Law
of Trust and Trustees, 2d § 206 p. 30 (If found to be a "dry or passive trust," the trust
assets belong to the settlor). Clearly then, Handy has no standing in this matter. To have
standing to pursue this claim, Handy must have "a legally protectible and tangible
interest at stake in the litigation." See Franklin Covey Client Sales v. Melvin, 2000 Ut.
App. 110 ^f 24 fn. 3, 2 P.3d 457. And he does not. Moreover, standing as such is a
significant issue which, like subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. See
Sierra Club v. Dept of Environmental Quality, 857 P.2d 982, 984 (Ut. App. 1983).
XL

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE
PRESUMPTION OF PAYMENT RULE AND HANDY
NEVER REBUTTED THAT PRESUMPTION
Handy makes a number of flawed arguments with respect to the District Court's
application of the common law presumption of payment rule to this passbook savings
account. Handy, for instance, argues that the running of the 20 year presumption rule is
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not triggered until his demand for payment in 2003. In the case of In re Fantozzi, 539
N.E. 2d 340 (111. App. 1989), the Illinois Court of Appeals considered a similar argument
and found in favor of the bank.
Fantozzi was a case in which the wife of Adolph Fantozzi who died in 1959,
found a savings account passbook while going through her husband's personal papers in
1983. The passbook showed an account number but listed no name. It also showed a
balance of more than $35,000. The bank had no records showing that the passbook was
an open account. Mrs. Fantozzi sued to obtain the money. The District Court found in
favor of the bank based upon the presumption of payment that arises after money goes
unclaimed for 20 years in a bank account. One of Fantozzi's arguments on appeal was
that the 20 year period, even if applicable, did not begin to run until she made demand
for payment.
The Illinois Court of Appeal reasoned, in essence, that since Mrs. Fantozzi was
not named on the account, the 20 year period to trigger the presumption of payment
commenced to run upon the death of her husband, assuming he owned the account. If, as
Handy surmises, Anderson opened the account, the 20 year period in this instance would
commence to run when Anderson died in 1972. Because Handy did not own the
account, he has no standing to challenge the commencement of the presumption of
payment rule. Furthermore, other courts dealing with this presumption in the context of
a passbook savings account appear to hold that the presumption period commences with
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the opening of the account and/or last activity shown in the account. See Hicks v. The
Exchange Bank & Trust Co., 478 S.W. 2d 54 (Ark. 1972); Commerce Union Bank v.
Horton, 475 S.W. 2d 660 (Tenn. 1972); Owens v. The Bank ofBruden, 302 So. 2d. 114
(Ala. App. 1974).
U.S. Bank further submits that not triggering the commencement of the
presumption until a demand for payment has been made would defeat the purpose of this
rule or doctrine of law. It is a statute of repose, a point made clear by the Tennessee
Supreme Court in Norton:
In all civilized countries where the law is administered as a science, having
reference to the peace, quiet and progress of society, as well as the
protection of individual rights, it has been thought wise that there should
be some limit to litigation, some boundary beyond which contests or
matters open to contest should be regarded as settled. Early in the judicial
history of England the presumption of payment was raised after a great
lapse of time between the creation of an obligation and an attempt to
enforce it in the courts. This presumption became part of the law of the
United States and is supplied in all jurisdictions. It originated in equity
. . . but was soon engraft in the common law, and has since been steadily
applied. It is not to be confused with the equitable doctrine of latches,
since latches is generally regarded as being not delay in long, but rather
delay of working a disadvantage to another.
Horton, 475 S.W. 2d at 682-683 (Emphasis added).26
Next, Handy argues that the presumption of payment rule should not apply to a
passbook savings account. Handy relies upon Pagano v. United New Jersey Bank, 670
A.2d 509 (N.J. 1995), 9 CJS. Banks & Banking § 276 and Michie On Banks and

The Norton court was quoting from the common law treatise Ruling Case Law.
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Banking, § 368(c) p. 705 for the proposition that the common law presumption of
payment rule does not apply to a passbook savings account. While it is true that Pagano
does so hold, the CJS and Michie citations are based solely on Pagano. In other words,
neither treatise refers to a case other than Pagano for this proposition, whereas the
District Court correctly noted (R. 250), that this presumption of payment from lapse of
time applies to all bank deposits, including passbook savings accounts. See Hicks, 478
S.W. 2d at 54; Central Nat'l Bank of McKinney, Texas v. Booher, 557 S.W. 2d 563 (Tx.
App. 1977); In re Fantozzi, 539 N.E. 2d at 340; Owens, 302 S. 2d at 114.27
Handy also argues that the presumption of payment rule is no longer consistent
with Oregon law, but not only is the common law presumption of payment rule a part of
Oregon's common law,28 it is consistent with Oregon's statutory law.
Any demand, savings or matured time deposit with a financial institution,
including a deposit that is automatically renewable, and any funds paid
toward the purchase of a share, mutual investment, certificate or any other
interest in a financial institution is presumed abandoned unless the owner,
within five (5) years has done one or more of the following:

27

The District Court actually refers to many more passbook savings account cases.
U.S. Bank selected these few because they are the more recent case law and with the
conversion from passbook savings accounts to statement savings accounts involving
computers, less and less case law on this issue is likely to be developed in the future. But
it remains a viable doctrine fully applicable to bank accounts, including passbook savings
accounts. See 10 Am. Jur. 2d, Banks & Financial Institutions § 768; 69ALR. 3d 1311.
28

The District Court discussed the existence of this common law presumption
under Oregon law. (R. 251.)
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(a)

In the case of a deposit, increase or decrease its
amount or presented the passbook or other
similar evidence for the crediting of interest.

(b)

Communicated in writing with the financial
institution concerning the property.

(c)

Otherwise indicated an interest in the property
as evidenced by a memorandum or other record
on file prepared by an employee of the
financial institution;

(d)

Owned other property to whichfflf(a), (b) or
(c) of this subsection applies, and the financial
institution has communicated in writing with
the owner with regard to the property that
would otherwise be presumed to be abandoned
under this section at the address to which
communications regarding the other property
regularly are sent.

(Oregon Revised Statute 98.308J) (Emphasis added). There is no evidence in this case
of any activity on the account in question since the initial deposits in 1971.
Finally, as to Handy9 s claim that the evidence he presented rebutted this common
law presumption, the District Court carefully explained why this was not so. The
District Court began by noting that "In the majority of cases allowing plaintiffs to
recover deposits, the plaintiff was the depositor and had personal knowledge regarding
the opening of the account." (R. 251.) The District Court went on to conclude that:
In this case, plaintiff does not know who opened the account, Plaintiff does
not know who made the deposits or how the passbook came into his
possession. Upon opening an account, the bank required its customers to
fill out a signature card. A customer could put different, or more, names
on the signature card than on the passbook. A properly authorized person
36

could also withdraw money without the passbook if his name appeared on
the signature card. Neither the Plaintiff nor the Court know whose names
appeared on the signature card. In the fall of 1980, the United States
National Bank of Oregon did away with its passbooks. All passbook
accounts converted to statement savings accounts. After the conversion,
passbooks became worthless. The bank told customers to throw their
passbooks away. The bank even handed extra passbooks out to children at
schools. After that conversion, the owner of the account could have
withdrawn from the account without the passbook. Neither the Plaintiff
nor the Court knows who else was authorized on the signature card. This
would be a very different case if the Plaintiff had opened the account
himself. As is, the Plaintiffs testimony that he did not authorize any other
person to withdraw from the account is severely discounted by the fact that
Plaintiff does not know who created the account, who else the account
owner might have authorized on tke signature card. The Court finds that
Plaintiff has not met the burden imposed on him to show that this account
has not been paid.
(R. 252-253.) That finding is not clearly erroneous and it is dispositive as to Handy's
claim that evidence submitted by him (consisting solely of his testimony and the
passbook) somehow rebutted the presumption of payment.
XII.
CONCLUSION
Fore the reasons above stated, this Court should affirm the District Court's ruling
and judgment entered in favor of U.S. Bank.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

y .:rcouiU
M b KAR ~ 1 P
GEORGE B. HANDY, Trustee,

&* *

3 : U8
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 040901807
Judge W. Brent West

vs.
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASS'N.
Defendant.

Plaintiff, George B. Handy, found a passbook in his credenza in October, 2003.
This passbook shows five deposits made between July 24 and September 14, 1971
totaling $150,000.00. The only name listed on the passbook is "George B. Handy,
Trustee." The passbook states that it "must be presented when a withdrawal is made."
This passbook shows no withdrawals. Mr. Handy has no idea how this particular
passbook came to rest in his credenza and does not know who opened the account or
made the deposits. Plaintiff promptly contacted the Defendant, U.S. Bank National
Association, who had merged with the issuing bank, United States National Bank of
Oregon. Defendant has no record of the account, its depositor, or of its closure. As the
Plaintiff testified, the origins and history of this account are a "complete mystery."
Plaintiff, acting as trustee, seeks to recover the principal shown in the passbook along
with the accumulated interest. The Court held trial on February 6, 2005. At trial, Preston
Handy appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff and Kevin Swenson on behalf of the
Defendant. The Court now finds in favor of the Defendant.
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1. Defendant's Affirmative Defenses: Escheat and Laches.
Defendant argues that any money in the account would have escheated to the
state. Under Oregon's Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, any deposit with
a bank "is presumed abandoned" unless the owner has taken some action within five
years. Or. Rev. Stat. § 98.308(1) (2003).1 Deposits that are presumed abandoned may be
subject to the custody of the State of Oregon. Id. at § 98.304. Escheat would be an
affirmative defense for the Defendant. However, the only evidence at trial was that this
account did not escheat to either Oregon or Utah. The fact that the account could have
escheated or even that it was required to escheat is not sufficient proof that it in fact did
escheat. The Court finds that there is no evidence of escheat and concludes that the
Defendant has not met its burden on this affirmative defense.
Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs claim is barred by the doctrine of laches.
This affirmative defense requires Defendant to show that (1) Plaintiff delayed asserting
his claim for an unreasonable length of time, (2) with full knowledge of all the relevant
facts, (3) resulting in such substantial prejudice to the Defendant that it would be
inequitable for the Court to grant Plaintiff relief. Bruns v. Walters, 28 P.3d 646 (Or. Ct.
App. 2001). The time begins to run on the Plaintiffs claim when Plaintiff "knew or
reasonably should have known he had an interest which was being threatened." Id. The
Defendant, as the party asserting laches, "has the burden of demonstrating that each
element exists." Myers v. Weems, 876 P.2d 861, 862 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). In this case,
Plaintiff discovered the passbook in October of 2003 and promptly took steps to recover
its stated funds. Plaintiff learned that his interest in the account was being threatened
1

The parties agree that because this account was opened in Oregon, Oregon law should apply. There does
not appear to be any significant difference between the relevant Oregon and Utah laws. However, where
possible the Court will apply Oregon law.
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when the Defendant refused to make payment. The Defendant had the burden to
establish, if possible, some fact or circumstance that would have placed Mr. Handy on
constructive notice that the funds were being threatened sooner than October, 2003.
Defendant has not made that required showing. The Defendant has not proven that
Plaintiff was placed on constructive notice and, therefore, has not met its burden to bar
Plaintiffs claim under laches.
2. The Passbook's Deposits are Presumed Paid.
After twenty years, an obligation is presumed to have been paid. Beekman v.
Hamlin, 25 P. 672 (Or. 1891). The presumption of payment from lapse of time applies to
bank deposits. Hicks v. Exch. Bank & Trust Co., 478 S.W.2d 54 (Ark. 1972); Long v.
Straus, 24 N.E. 664 (Ind. 1890); Morse v. Nat'l Cent. Bank, 132 A. 598 (Md. 1926);
Boscowitzv. Chase Natl Bank, 111 N.Y.S.2d 147 (1952); Second Nat'l Bank v.
Thompson, 44 Pa. Super. 200 (1910); Commerce Union Bank v. Horton, 475 S.W.2d 660
(Tenn. 1972); Blackstone v. First Nat'l Bank, 192P.2d411 (Wyo. 1948); Cent. Nat'l
Bank of McKinney, Texas v. Booher, 557 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Owens v.
Bank ofBrewton, 302 So. 2d 114 (Ala. App. 1974); In re Fantozzi, 539 N.E.2d 340 (111.
App. Ct. 1989); Wool v NationsBank of Va., N.A., 448 S.E.2d 613 (Va. 1994). But see
Pagano v. United Jersey Bank, 670 A.2d 509 (NJ. 1995) (refusing to extend the
presumption to bank deposits). In this case, the passbook shows five deposits made
between July 24 and September 14, 1971. Plaintiff had not taken any action on this
account until December 2003—a period of 32 years. Accordingly, the Court presumes
that the Defendant has paid the deposits.
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As a plaintiff, Mr. Handy has the burden to prove his claim, including the
existence of the debt, by a preponderance of the evidence. Additionally, the presumption
of payment from lapse of time, having arisen, places the burden on the Plaintiff to show
that the debt has not been paid.2 Beekman v. Hamlin, 25 P. 672 (Or. 1891); see 69
A.L.R.3d 1311 (1995) (explaining that the common law presumption is an evidentiary
rule placing the burden on the party seeking to recover the debt). The Plaintiff must
show "by competent evidence that the debt. . . has not been paid." Beekman, 25 P. at
672 (requiring plaintiff "to show by something more than his bond that the debt has not
been paid"). The presumption "is a strong one [and] the evidence to rebut it must be
satisfactory and convincing...." Id. at 673. In this case, the passbook shows the
deposits and expressly states that withdrawals require presentation of the passbook.
"George B. Handy, Trustee" is the only name appearing on the passbook. Mr. Handy has
not made any withdrawals and has not authorized any other person to make withdrawals.
There is no other competent evidence that these deposits have not been paid.
Other courts have considered claims to collect deposits presumed paid by lapse of
time, with some allowing recovery and some holding for the bank. See 69 A.L.R.3d 1311
at §§ 4, 5 (1995). In the majority of cases allowing plaintiffs to recover deposits, the
plaintiff was the depositor and had personal knowledge regarding the opening of the
account. See Cent. Bank ofMcKinney, Texas v. Booher, 557 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. App.
1977) (allowing depositor to recover balances shown on a passbook issued to her after
2

Defendant moved for summary judgment arguing that Plaintiffs claim was barred by the presumption of
payment. The Court denied Defendant's motion noting that the passbook was some evidence of
nonpayment. As a motion for summary judgment, the Court viewed that evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. In denying Defendant's motion, the Court did not grant summary
judgment on that issue to the Plaintiff, who had not filed a summary judgment motion of his own. Having
now heard the evidence regarding the passbook, the bank's practices, and the extent of Plaintiff s
knowledge, the Court assigns the passbook what the Court considers to be its appropriate weight.
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43 years where depositor testified that she made no withdrawals); Second Natl Bank v.
Thompson, 44 Pa. Super. 200 (1910) (finding that the presumption was overcome where
the defendant depositor and his wife testified "emphatically" that they had not been paid).
Among the cases finding the evidence insufficient to recover on a deposit after 20 years,
the plaintiff often had no personal knowledge of the deposits and did not set up the
account. See In re Fantozzi, 539 N.E.2d 340 (111. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that plaintiff
who discovered her late-husband's passbook 24 years after the last deposit had not
presented sufficient evidence where plaintiff knew almost nothing regarding her
husband's financial affairs or of the account in question); Owens v. Bank ofBrewton, 302
So. 2d 114 (Ala. App. 1974) (holding that the executor of the account owner, who had no
knowledge of the account other than the information contained in the passbook, had
presented insufficient evidence).
In this case, Plaintiff does not know who opened the account. Plaintiff does not
know who made the deposits or how the passbook came into his possession. Upon
opening an account, the bank required its customers to fill out a signature card. A
customer could put different, or more, names on the signature card than on the passbook.
A properly authorized person could also withdraw money without the passbook if his
name appeared on the signature card. Neither the Plaintiff nor the Court knows whose
names appeared on the signature card. In the Fall of 1980, the United States National
Bank of Oregon did away with its passbooks. All passbook accounts converted to
statement savings accounts. After the conversion, passbooks became worthless. The
bank told customers to throw their passbooks away. The bank even handed extra
passbooks out to children at schools. After that conversion, the owner of the account
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could have withdrawn from the account without the passbook. Neither the Plaintiff nor
the Court knows who else was authorized on the signature card. This would be a very
different case if the Plaintiff had opened the account himself. As is, the Plaintiffs
testimony that he did not authorize any other person to withdraw from the account is
severely discounted by the fact that Plaintiff does not know who created the account or
who else the account owner might have authorized on the signature card. The Court finds
that Plaintiff has not met the burden imposed on him to show that this account has not
been paid.
3. Plaintiff as Trustee.
The name on the passbook is "George B. Handy, Trustee." Although not
dispositive in this case, the Court believes that the status of this "trust" merits attention.
Creating a trust requires more than using the word "trust." One requirement to create a
trust is to have an ascertainable beneficiary. Agan v. United States Natl Bank, 363 P.2d
765 (Or. 1961); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 112. Another requirement is that the
settlor impose some affirmative duties on the trustee. Lee v. Melons 527 P.2d 414 (Or.
1974); Phillips v. Dep't of Revenue, 6 Or. Tax. 157 (1975). A trust that imposes no
duties on the trustee is considered "dry." Id. A dry trust fails and the property passes to
the intended beneficiary outright. Id. When a trust fails, the grantee holds the property
under a resulting trust for the benefit of the grantor or the grantor's estate. Restatement
(Second) of Trusts §411. In this case, there is no trust document other than the passbook
itself. Plaintiff does not know who the settlor was, although there is speculation. There
are no ascertainable beneficiaries and the passbook does not impose any affirmative
duties on the Plaintiff. In effect, the trust failed at its conception.
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The Court, therefore, finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show by
satisfactory evidence that the debt has not been paid. The Court finds in favor of the
Defendant. Mr. Swenson will please prepare the appropriate findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
Dated this

W - day of March, 2006.

W. Brent West, Judge
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AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
Defendant.

Case No. 040901807
Judge W. Brent West

:

This matter came before the court for a bench trial on February 6, 2006. Plaintiff was
represented by Preston L. Handy of Siegfried & Jensen, and defendant was represented by Kevin
D. Swenson of Suitter Axland, PLLC. The court having reviewed the pleadings and testimony,
heard argument in the matter, and hearing the testimony of witnesses at trial, makes the following
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

040901807

VD18994524
US BANK NATIONAL ASSOC

S

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff, George B. Handy, found a passbook issued by the United States National

Bank of Oregon in his credenza in October 2003.
2.

Prior to October 2003, plaintiff was unaware of the existence of the passbook.

3.

The passbook was identified as Account Number 403111-8 (the "Passbook").

4.

The Passbook showed five (5) deposits made between July 24 and September 14,

5.

The five (5) deposits totaled $ 150,000.

6.

The Passbook had George B. Handy, Trustee, written on it.

7.

Plaintiff did not know who wrote the name on the Passbook.

8.

The Passbook showed no withdrawals.

9.

Plaintiff had no idea how the Passbook came to rest in his credenza.

10.

Plaintiff did not know who opened Account Number 403111-8 (the "Account") or

1971.

who made the deposits that were shown in the Passbook.
11.

Prior to August 1971, a client of plaintiff had asked if he could put money in

plaintiffs trust account, or a trust account in his name.
12.

Plaintiff did not make the deposits into the Account.

13.

Plaintiff did not open the Account.

14.

Defendant had no record of this Account.

15.

Plaintiff did not know who was authorized to take money out of the Account.
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16.

The express terms of the Passbook required the presentation of the Passbook for

withdrawals.
17.

A Signature Card is required to open every Account.

18.

Plaintiff did not sign a Signature Card for the Account.

19.

There is no evidence that the Account escheated to any State.

20.

Plaintiff did not take any action on this matter until December 2003.

21.

In the Fall of 1980, the United States National Bank of Oregon did away with its

passbook accounts. All passbook accounts were converted to statement savings accounts.
22.

Plaintiff did not receive notice of the change to statement savings accounts.

23.

Plaintiff did not receive any correspondence from defendant regarding the

Account.
24.

Defendant did not have any records of the Account.

25.

After the conversion to statement savings accounts, passbooks became worthless.

26.

After the conversion to statement savings accounts, bank representatives told

customers they could throw their passbooks away.
27.

Plaintiff presented no evidence of a trust having in fact been created with regard

to this Passbook Account.
28.

There was no ascertainable beneficiary identified for the alleged trust associated

with the Passbook Account.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendant did not meet his burden of proof on the affirmative defense that the -

funds in the Passbook had escheated to any State.
2.

Defendant did not meet his burden of proof that the plaintiff had been on

constructive notice prior to October 2003 regarding the existence of the Passbook; therefore, it
did not meet his burden that plaintiffs claims were barred by the doctrine of laches.
3*

Based on Oregon law, after 20 years, an obligation is presumed to have been paid.

4.

The presumption of payment from lapse of time applies to bank deposits.

5.

The court finds that there is a presumption that the defendant has paid the

deposits.
6.

Plaintiff has the burden to prove his claim, including the existence of the debt, by

a preponderance of the evidence.
7.

Plaintiff has the burden to show that the debt has not been paid.

8.

Plaintiff must make this showing that the debt has been paid "by competent

evidence that the d e b t . . . has not been paid."
9.

Plaintiff had no evidence other than his own testimony that he did not withdraw

the money or authorize anyone else to withdraw the money to show that the deposits had not
been paid.
10.

Plaintiff did not meet the burden imposed upon him to show that this Account has

not been paid.
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11.

The court finds that because plaintiff has failed to meet his burden in his case, his

claim must fail.
12.

Judgment in this matter is for the defendant, finding no cause of action.

13.

Plaintiff filed a request for attorneys' fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-

56. Section 78-27-56 allows for attorneys' fees to a prevailing party if the "court determines that
the action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith."
14.

In this case, plaintiff was not the prevailing party and there is no showing that the

defense was brought in bad faith, as shown by the fact that the defendant was the prevailing party
in this case.
15.

Plaintiffs motions for attorneys' fees are accordingly denied.

DATED this 2S~ day of April, 2006.
BY THE COURT:

W Brent West
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM
AND^QNTENT:

resami L* Handy
(Attorn^s f&r Plaintiff
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I hereby certify that on this '%£) day of April, 2006,1 caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be deposited in the
United States mail, first-class, postage prepaid to:
Preston L. Handy, Esq.
5664 South Green Street
Murray, UT 84123
Attorney for Plaintiff
George B. Handy, Attorney
2650 Washington Blvd., Suite 102
Ogden,UT 84401
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